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Abstract: 
In recent years, Commodity Dependent Developing Countries (CDDCs) have faced 
multiple global food, energy and climate crises, compounded by the recent financial and 
economic crises, which have increased their vulnerability to excessive price volatility in 
commodity markets. Moreover, structural vulnerabilities in most CDDCs render their 
economies more vulnerable to increased commodity market turbulence than developed 
countries, given their comparatively lower income and high dependence on commodity 
exports. This paper aims to empirically examine the patterns and underlying causes of 
excessive price volatility for two major soft commodities of critical importance to many 
of the poorest CDDCs: coffee and cocoa. It aims to identify interactions, similarities and 
causalities between coffee and cocoa prices on the one hand and, oil and futures prices 
on the other hand. Our analysis of coffee and cocoa historical prices shows that, coffee 
price volatility has uneven or varied impact depending on the nature of the market 
shock. Oil price spillover effects on coffee and cocoa markets are also assessed using 
cointegration and error-correction models. Long-run causality is found between oil 
prices, and coffee and cocoa prices but, only cocoa has an equilibrium relationship with 
oil in the long-term. Given the results, this study proposes some policy 
recommendations for managing price risk and addressing regulation in cocoa and coffee 
exporting countries. 
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1 Introduction 
 
Since 2000, Commodity Dependent Developing Countries (CDDCs) have faced multiple 
global food, energy and climate crises, compounded by the recent financial and 
economic crises which have increased their vulnerability to excessive price volatility3 in 
commodity markets. Moreover, structural vulnerabilities in most CDDCs render their 
economies more vulnerable to increased commodity market turbulence than developed 
countries, given their comparatively lower income and high dependence on commodity 
exports. The World Bank estimates that 119 million more people have been pushed into 
hunger as a result of the 2008 food crisis. There are now an estimated 1.02 billion 
malnourished people worldwide (World Bank 2009). 
 
Meanwhile, the FAO estimates that more than 75 million people were driven into 
hunger between 2006 and 2010 (FAO 2011). The Least Developed Countries (LDCs)4 
and CDDCs were particularly harmed by this crisis. The LDCs were particularly affected 
by the 2007-2008 food crises because the average household spend around 70-80 per 
cent of their income on food (UNCTAD 2009). 
 
Although supply and demand fundamentals played a significant role in the food crisis 
outbreak, many other factors contributed to the food crisis. For example, large increases 
in oil prices contributed to rising production costs and drove food prices higher. The 
World Bank estimated that weakness of the dollar accounted for 15 per cent of the food 
price increases between 2002 and 2008 (Mitchell 2008). Additionally, over the last 
decade, major weather events such as drought in Russia, exceptional frosts in Brazil 
and, excessive rainfall in Canada and Australia caused major disruptions to agricultural 
production (particularly for cereals). Price fluctuations are inherent in agricultural 
                                                        
3 Volatility is a statistical measure of the tendency of an asset's price to vary over time. It is usually 
captured in the standard deviation or variance. 
4 Least developed countries refer to the 48 countries which the United Nations recognises as ‘the world’s 
poorest and weakest countries’, exhibiting the lowest indicators of social and economic development. 
They have a population not exceeding 75 million and a per capita gross national income (GNI) of less than 
US$905). See UN-ORHLSS website: http://www.unohrlls.org/en/ldc/related/59/ (4 January 2010). 
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markets – partly due to the supply-demand dynamics and the unpredictability of 
weather patterns and harvest yields. 
 
There are also debates as to the extent to which activity in futures trades and over the 
counter markets (OTC) for agricultural commodities impact on this volatility. Whatever 
the cause, extreme volatility in food prices deters producers from making the necessary 
investments for increasing productivity and production: this is one of the underlying 
causes of continued worldwide food insecurity.  
 
This study intends to explore the gravity of the commodity trade and development 
problematique vis-à-vis high food, energy prices and volatile markets for the world’s 
most vulnerable CDDCs. It aims to empirically explore underlying price behavior and 
volatility in the coffee and cocoa markets, and also to identify interactions, similarities 
and causalities between coffee and cocoa prices on the one hand and, oil and futures 
prices on the other hand. This study will first provide an overview of the world coffee 
and cocoa markets. Next, we introduce the data employed for use in the empirical 
analyses. The Generalized Autoregressive Conditional Heteroskedasticity (GARCH) 
models for Arabica coffee, Robusta coffee and cocoa are then estimated and interpreted. 
We then empirically consider the price-effects of both energy and financial products 
using Granger-causality and cointegration methods to explore potential long-term trend 
similarities. Last, we consider the empirical results to formulate a few policy 
recommendations aimed at reducing risks associated with commodity price volatility in 
CDDCs.  
 
2 Overview of the world coffee and cocoa markets  
 
Coffee and cocoa are both tropical commodities mainly produced in CDDCs and have 
experienced extreme variability in their prices over the last 40 years. In fact, coffee and 
cocoa price variations have proven very large compared to cereals or meat. In this 
paper we differentiate between Arabica and Robusta coffee as they are  different 
varieties of coffee and traded on separate exchange markets. Coffee and cocoa have 
similar long-run price trends (see Figure 1).  
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Figure 1 Monthly current price trends of coffee and cocoa  
(1960-2011) 
 
Source: UNCTADSTAT databse, accessed July 2011. 
 
Most of the production of these commodities is located in LDCs and developing 
countries in Africa, South America and South Asia (see Table 1 and Figure 2). Thus, 
coffee and cocoa price volatility is of acute economic importance for CDDCs. As coffee 
and cocoa are two major Sub-Saharan African (SSA) export crops, they represent a 
major source of income for many developing countries that have a strong commodity-
export dependence. For example, cocoa crop exports in Ghana during 2009-2010 
accounted for 55 per cent of total commodity exports. Similarly, cocoa crop exports 
provide a livelihood for 25 per cent of the Cote d'Ivoire's population and 42 per cent of 
its commodity exports.  During 2009-2010, in Burundi the share of coffee represented 
63 per cent of total commodity exports and 30 per cent in Ethiopia (UNCTADSTAT 
2012, FAO 2006). For coffee and cocoa exporting CDDCs, price volatility is a major cause 
of concern while it is a relatively minor concern for most importing countries. For the 
former, significant fluctuations in world prices may have dramatic effects both at the 
national and producer levels as extreme volatility in prices deters producers from 
making the necessary investments for increasing productivity and production. For most 
importing countries, changes in coffee or cocoa prices would most likely result in 
relatively minor changes in consumption habits. 
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Involving over fifty producing countries, of which thirty are importers, coffee is one of 
the most widely traded commodities. Coffee is a perennial crop that is produced from 
the same root structure for two or more years. As a seasonal crop; varying from country 
to country, supply for the most part is often unpredictable. For many developing 
country governments, and the private sector coffee production, trade and consumption 
is a critical contributor to socio-economic development. 
 
Table 1 Main cocoa and coffee exporting countries 
Cocoa exporting countries Coffee exporting countries 
Brazil 
Cameroon 
Côte d'Ivoire 
Dominican Republic 
Ecuador 
Gabon 
Ghana 
Malaysia 
Nicaragua 
Nigeria 
Papua New Guinea 
Sierra Leone 
Togo 
Trinidad and Tobago 
Venezuela 
  
Angola 
Brazil 
Burundi 
Central African Republic 
Colombia 
Costa Rica 
Cote d'Ivoire 
Cuba 
Ecuador 
El Salvador 
Ethiopia 
Gabon 
Ghana 
Guatemala 
Honduras 
India 
Indonesia 
Kenya 
Liberia 
Mexico 
Nicaragua 
Panama 
Papua New Guinea 
Philippines 
Sierra Leone 
Tanzania 
Thailand 
Timor-Leste 
Togo  
Uganda 
Vietnam  
Yemen 
Source: FAO (2011) 
 
The Intercontinental Exchange (ICE) which is part of the New York Board of Trade 
(NYBOT) governs the world Arabica price through Futures U.S. Coffee "C" contracts 
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while Robusta coffee has been traded for over twenty years on the London International 
Financial Futures Exchange (LIFFE)5. 
 
Figure 2 CDDC Coffee and coca exports as a share of all commodity exports (%), 
2009-2010 
 
Source: UNCTAD, UNCTADstat (accessed September 2012). 
Note(s):  
* CDDCs in Asia does not include Oceania 
* CDDCs in Latin America (incl. Central America, South America and the Caribbean) 
SITC codes: Coffee and coffee substitutes [071]; Cocoa [072]. Primary commodities, precious stones and 
non-monetary gold (SITC 0 + 1 + 2 + 3 + 4 + 68 + 667+ 971). 
 
Cocoa, although produced and exported in smaller volumes, has many similarities with 
coffee. Ninety per cent of the cocoa producing countries also produce coffee (see Table 
1). While primarily consumed in Organization for Economic Cooperation and 
Development (OECD) countries, cocoa is exclusively produced in developing countries; 
which makes cocoa price volatility an important issue for CDDCs. Cocoa harvests and 
thus productivity levels are highly dependent on prevalent weather conditions. Since 
                                                        
5 The International Coffee Organization (ICO) is the main intergovernmental organization in charge of 
collecting and sharing information on coffee and of establishing international cooperation in the coffee 
sector. In 1882, with its entry into the Coffee Exchange of New York (later part of the Coffee, Sugar and 
Cocoa Exchange), coffee prices became more volatile. The mandates of the International Cocoa 
Organization (ICCO) focus on enhancing the economic, social and environmental sustainability of the 
world cocoa economy. 
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1925, cocoa has been traded on the New York Cocoa Exchange before joining the Coffee, 
Cocoa and Sugar Exchange and later the ICE, as part of NYBOT6. 
 
2.1 Commodity price volatility 
 
Commodity prices have shown considerable volatility over the past decade.7 The price 
boom between 2002 and 2008 was the most pronounced in several decades – in 
magnitude, duration and breadth. Moreover, the price decline following the onset of the 
recent global crisis in mid-2008 stands out both for its sharpness and for the number of 
commodities affected (UCDR, 2012). Since mid-2009, and especially since the summer 
of 2010, global commodity prices have again been steadily rising. (see Figure 3). 
 
Figure 3. Current prices of: Arabica, Robusta, Cocoa, and Oil, 1990-2011  
(in logarithms) 
 
Source: UNCTADSTAT and World Bank Commodity Price Data (Pink Sheet) (accessed April 2011). 
 
There are many explanations for the apparent volatility in commodity markets, 
including the so-called financialization of commodities as an asset class.  The high prices 
across a broad range of commodities -- and the potential diversification benefits of a 
                                                        
6 Cocoa futures contracts are primarily traded and denominated in UK pounds. 
7 Price volatility is a measure of price variation from one period to the next. 
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wide array of investment opportunities -- has attracted speculative investors (e.g. hedge 
funds, commodity index and exchange-traded-funds) into commodity markets. Between 
2003 and 2008, speculative investment in commodity indexes was estimated to have 
increased from $15 billion to around $200 billion (see UCDR, 2012). 
 
Long-term comparisons show that recent price volatility is not unprecedented for 
individual commodities.8 For example, oil price volatility in 2008, while remarkable, 
remained well below its spike of the early 1970s. Therefore, examining the short-term 
constant prices provides a better insight with regard to recent food price developments. 
The chart below presents the coefficients of variation (CV) for various food commodities 
and oil. 


CV
  (1) 
 
The CV (1) connects the standard deviation ( ) to the mean ( ) so that the mean of 
the data is considered allowing for cross-commodity comparisons. CV is a basic measure 
of price dispersion; it serves to compare the degree of variability from one data series to 
another. 
 
Long-term comparisons show that recent price volatility is not unprecedented for 
individual commodities (see Jacks, Rourke and Williamson, 2011). Figure 4 presents the 
coefficients of variation for various food commodities and oil (for comparison 
purposes).9 It shows the long-term volatility of commodities prices using annual 
constant prices for six commodities over the period 1960-2010 and indicates that the 
more recent price fluctuations during 1990-2010 are unexceptional for some 
commodities (Calvo-Gonzales, Shankar and Trezzi, 2010). The volatility of coffee prices 
was similar to that of most agricultural products over the past 50 years. Petroleum and 
sugar prices were the most volatile during the period 1960-2010. However, it should be 
noted that the volatility estimates below do not take into account trends which could be 
                                                        
8 Jacks DS, O’Rourke KH and Williamson JG (2011), and Calvo-Gonzales O, Shankar R and Trezzi R (2010). 
9 The coefficient of variation is a basic measure of price dispersion; it serves to compare the degree of 
variability from one data series to another. 
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important in the context of a commodity super cycle, as for example in the case of real 
metals prices (Cuddington and Jerret, 2008). More specifically, the magnitude of the 
most recent upswing of food and metals prices was above the historical average, while 
the magnitude of the price rebound for oil was similar to historical averages, but 
occurred more rapidly (Baffes and Haniotis, 2010). 
 
Figure 4. Coefficients of variation for selected commodities in the short and long 
run, 1960-1970 to 2000–201010 
 
Note:  The coefficient of variation (ratio) is based on annual constant dollar values (2000=100). The time 
series covers the period 1960–2010. Annual variation in selected real commodity prices, by decade. 
 
The coefficient of variation is very sensitive to outliers hence; for example, the large 
amplitude of price swings that occurred during the 1979-1981 financial crisis11 for a 
broad range of commodities may bias the indicator. Although the CV does not reach its 
1970-1980 historical peak, for most of the commodities' volatility has risen significantly 
over the last decade. We explore some of these issues empirically in sections 3 and 4 of 
the paper.
                                                        
10 The coefficient of variation is based on annual constant dollar values (2000=100). The time series 
covers the period 1960-2010.  
11 The financial crisis of 1979-1981 had many similarities to the recent global financial crisis of 2009-
2010. For example, the US dollar was falling, inflation in the USA was approaching 13 per cent and a high 
level of unemployment at 13 per cent was exacerbated by a concomitant energy crisis in 1979 which let 
to rapidly escalating energy food prices. On commodity markets, precious metals again became a safe 
haven for investors with gold reaching $850 and silver $50 an ounce. 
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3 Exploring coffee and cocoa price volatility 
 
In this paper, coffee and cocoa price volatility is empirically investigated using GARCH-
type models (comprising a sample size consists of 249 observations). We use 
logarithmic transformations of monthly constant prices of Arabica and Robusta from 
January 1990 to September 2010 (12 months*20 years+9 months= 249 months)12. For 
section 4 of the paper, we use the logarithms of monthly current prices for Arabica, 
Robusta, cocoa and oil. Daily futures prices of Arabica, Robusta and cocoa were 
collected from Bloomberg. Monthly averages were computed in order to conduct a 
causality analysis. Cocoa futures prices are extracted from the  London International 
Financial Futures and Options Exchange (LIFFE) and are converted from UK (£) pounds 
sterling to US dollars using the monthly average of the Bank of England’s spot exchange 
rate statistics. Table 2 lists the commodity price series, sources and units of 
measurement utilized in this paper. The deflator that is used to compute constant prices 
from current price ( 100*/tan MUVCurrenttCons  ) is the UN Unit Value Index of 
Manufactured (MUV) goods exports.  
 
Food price variations are often large and unpredictable. Greater price unpredictability 
and uncertainty about future developments, often leads to higher price risks being 
borne by producers, exporters, importers and stock holders who are then very likely to 
review their investment decisions. To reduce disruption in both coffee and cocoa 
markets will require an empirically accurate measure of volatility that takes into 
account specifications relative to each commodity and allows the prediction of future 
price developments. ARCH and GARCH processes defined as "mean zero, serially 
uncorrelated processes with non-constant variances that are conditioned on past 
information" (Aradhyula and Ho, 1988) are useful economic analysis tools with strong 
forecasting accuracy. 
                                                        
12 The 1990-2010 period corresponds to the free market period on commodity markets. 
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Table 2 Specification for commodity prices 
Source: ICO, ICCO Bloomberg, the World Bank 
 
GARCH models use past prices to model and forecast conditional variances. They also 
allow a wide range of possible specifications to both model volatility and examine 
volatility persistence and asymmetry in coffee prices over time. Any GARCH model 
assumes that prices have a time-varying (non-constant) variance which means that in 
some periods, markets are more volatile than in others. The objective of this section of 
the paper is to characterize the conditional variance of Arabica, Robusta and cocoa price 
series. Let us assume that the Arabica prices series AtP 13 are generated by the 
autoregressive process: 
 
t
p
i
A
ti
A
t PcP   


1
1
  (4.1) 
 
                                                        
13 
R
tP  stands for Robusta price and 
C
tP  for cocoa price. 
Commodities Period (mm/yyyy) Price Specifications Source Unit 
Arabica (A) 01/1990 - 09/2010 Monthly average  ICO US¢/kg 
  constant prices   
Robusta (R) 01/1990 - 09/2010 Monthly average  ICO US¢/kg 
  constant prices   
Cocoa (C) 01/1990 - 09/2010 Monthly average ICCO US¢/kg 
  constant prices   
Arabica (A) 01/1990 - 04/2011 Monthly average  ICO US¢/kg 
  current prices   
Robusta (R) 01/1990 - 04/2011 Monthly average  ICO US¢/kg 
  current prices   
Cocoa (C) 01/1990 - 04/2011 Monthly average  ICCO US¢/kg 
  current prices   
Petroleum Crude 01/1990 - 04/2011 Monthly average prices Bloomberg $/bbl 
  Of Brent, Dubai and  World Bank  
  West Texas   
(A) futures prices 01/1990 - 04/2011 Daily current prices Bloomberg  US$/lb 
(R) futures prices 11/1991 - 01/2009 Daily current prices Bloomberg US$/MT 
(C) futures prices 01/1990 - 04/2011 Daily current prices Bloomberg GBP/MT 
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While the conditional variance is presented in a GARCH (1, 1) model with a constant, 
past information about volatility ( 2 1t ) and past forecast variance (
2
1th ): 
 
),0(~1 ttt hN  
2
1
2
1
2
  ttt hh     (4.2) 
 
The conditional variance 2th  of the information set available at time t-1 1t considers 
varying confidence intervals of volatility.  
 
Table 3 presents univariate GARCH (1, 1) parameters for the mean and the variance 
equations of both coffees and cocoa. The preferred regression has the AR order p and 
the moving average (MA) order q that minimize the Schwarz information criterion 
(SIC)14. In addition, regressions are estimated using a range of {1; 5} for p and {0; 5} for 
q and the combination of p and q with the lowest SIC is the preferred model. 
 
                                                        
14 The Schwarz information criterion (SIC) is a criterion for model selection among a finite set of models. 
It is based, in part, on the likelihood function, and it is closely related to Akaike information criterion 
(AIC). Although the original derivation assumes that the observed data is independent, identically 
distributed, and arising from a probability distribution in the regular exponential family, SIC has 
traditionally been used in a much larger scope of model selection problems. 
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Table 3 GARCH (1, 1) tests results 
 
Cocoa:  AR (1) 
ttt pcCocoa   11  
Arabica: AR (1)  
ttt pcA   11  
Robusta: ARMA (1,1) 
tttt pcR    1111  
Conditional variance  2
1
2
1
2
  ttt hh   
 
 Cocoa            Arabica                Robusta 
ARMA c 4.940 5.260 4.610 
 
 (0.158) (0.132) (0.206) 
φ 0.976 0.969 0.972 
 (0.011) (0.015) (0.014) 
γ   0.241 
   (0.075) 
GARCH δ 0.001 0.002 0.002 
 
 (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) 
α 0.247 0.178 0.144 
 (0.080) (0.067) (0.067) 
β 0.622 0.505 0.525 
 (0.121) (0.210) (0.244) 
α+β 0.870 0.682 0.669 
Schwarz -2.742 -2.264 -2.418 
 Adjusted R^2 0.947 0.940 0.968 
 
The Arabica results show that AR(1) is the specification that maximizes the best quality 
of fit. Robusta on the other hand is best approximated with the model ARMA(1,1) and, 
both the AR and the MA coefficients are significantly different from 0. Finally, cocoa is 
best approximated by an AR(1) model. All the coefficients in Table 3 are significant and 
the regressions show a high adjusted R-squared, meaning that the estimated 
parameters of the conditional mean have a strong explanatory power of historical price 
movements. Given the high adjusted R-squared, it would seem that GARCH models 
perform well at modelling conditional variance. Nonetheless, this is no guarantee that 
the GARCH process is a statistically valid improvement over the AR(MA) process 
(Aradhyula and Holt, 1988). Therefore, we test the GARCH hypothesis that the 
conditional variances are in fact, not constant using the following hypothesis: 
 
0,0:0  H  
00:1   orH  
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A Wald test of the joint significance of α and β is conducted for the three commodities in 
Table 4. The statistics used in a Wald test is the Chi-squared; if the p-value of the chi-
squared exceeds the significance level (0.05) the null hypothesis of stationarity in the 
volatility cannot be rejected. Results indicate that p-values of the Chi-squared 
distributions of Arabica, Robusta and Cocoa are all equal to 0, thus, we reject the null 
hypothesis of stationarity in the conditional forecast variances; GARCH is an 
improvement over the AR process for the three tropical commodities. 
 
Table 4 Wald Test: Test of the GARCH hypothesis 
Wald Test:    
0,0:0  H  Test Statistic Value df Probability 
Equation: COCOA_GARCH 
F-statistic 53.76003 (2, 243) 0.000 
Chi-square 107.5201 2 0.000        REJECT 
Equation: ARABICA_GARCH 
F-statistic 31.58837 (2, 243) 0.000 
Chi-square 63.17674 2 0.000         REJECT 
Equation: ROBUSTA_GARCH 
F-statistic 15.88593 (2, 242) 0.000 
Chi-square 31.77186 2 0.000         REJECT 
 
From the GARCH analysis, it is possible to infer that shocks in prices are reflected in 
volatility, but one might also consider how changes in variability evolve when shocks 
are positive or negative. Understanding volatility in response to positive or negative 
shocks is crucial for CDDC producers so they can predict future volatility in commodity 
prices with more accuracy and thus, improve the estimation of future revenue streams. 
Also, Nelson (1991) and Schwert (1989) maintain that stock volatility is higher during 
recessions and financial crisis. We attempt to model how changes in variability evolve 
when shocks are positive or negative by introducing symmetry or leverage effects in the 
variance to GARCH models. The Exponential Generalized Autoregressive Conditional 
Heteroskedasticity (EGARCH) is used  to estimate the logarithm of conditional variance 
in order to determine whether or not the observed volatility reacts asymmetrically to 
“good” and, or “bad” news. Good news in the case of a commodity might be favourable 
weather forecasts for coffee and cocoa crops or policies that promote agricultural 
development and growth; whilst bad news may for example be a natural disaster or 
calamitous weather event (hurricane, tornado, flooding etc) or for example sharp rises 
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in oil prices. In order to assess this for cocoa and coffee we estimate the following 
EGARCH: 
 
)log()log( 2 12
1
1
2
2
1
1
1
2




  t
t
t
t
t
t h
hh
h 




  (4.3) 
In this model the effects of residuals is exponential and not quadratic. The asymmetry is 
measured by the coefficient 2 ; if it is negative and significant, as for many financial 
assets, there is positive asymmetry and negative price shocks have a stronger impact on 
price volatility than positive shocks. The impact of positive shocks (good news) is 
measured by 2 121 )(  th  whereas the impact of negative shocks is captured 
by 2 121 )(  th . The hypothesis tested with the EGARCH model is the following: 
0: 20 H  
0: 20 H  
 
The results in Table 5 show the EGARCH is preferred for cocoa, Arabica and Robusta 
regressions with regard to the SIC. Results show that none of the asymmetric 
2 coefficients are negative and, only 2 for cocoa is approximately equal to zero 
( 2 =0.035) meaning that, positive and negative shocks have approximately the same 
impact on its volatility. In addition, the GARCH (1, 1) model has a smaller SIC than the 
EGARCH model and thus, cocoa volatility is better approximated with the asymmetry 
specification. On the other hand, the asymmetry coefficients for arabica and robusta are 
large and significant: for arabica, 422.02  , and for Robusta 351.02   and, both p-
values are equal to zero. The SIC indicates that the EGARCH describes the volatility in 
world coffee prices better than the GARCH (1, 1). Positive shocks have a more 
prominent effect on the observed volatility than negative shocks.  
 
An empirical examination of the varying volatility of coffees and cocoa enables the 
estimation of best fit for the modelling of these three commodities. In the case of cocoa, 
prices follow an autoregressive process of order one AR(1) and its conditional variance 
is a GARCH (1,1) process. Arabica and robusta prices follow an ARMA model of order 
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p=4, q=2 for arabica and p=1, q=1 for robusta. Both coffees conditional variances are 
better estimated with the EGARCH model. 
 
Table 5 EGARCH: test results for cocoa, Arabica and Robusta 
Cocoa:  AR (1) 
ttt pcCocoa   11  
Arabica: ARMA (4, 2)  
tttttttt ppppcA    221144332211  
Robusta; ARMA (1, 1) 
tttt pcR    1111  
  
EGARCH:  
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 Coefficient Cocoa Arabica Robusta 
ARMA c 4.911 5.410 4.747 
AR   0.139 0.285 0.258 
1  
0.974 1.248 0.980 
  0.010 0.075 0.010 
2  
- -1.048 - 
 - 0.096 - 
3  
- 1.037 - 
 - 0.080 - 
4  
- -0.269 - 
 - 0.069 - 
MA 
1  
- -0.088 0.223 
  - 0.029 0.067 
2  
- 0.931 - 
 - 0.032 - 
EGARCH   -2.073 -3.178 -2.308 
  0.710 0.574 0.777 
1  
0.542 -0.036 0.015 
 0.135 0.141 0.146 
2  
0.035* 0.422 0.351 
 0.090 0.104 0.086 
  
0.712 0.402 0.579 
 0.117 0.110 0.138 
 SIC -2.721 -2.280 -2.466 
* Note: Only Cocoa 2  coefficient is significantly equal to 0. 
 
Although the price correlations between the three commodities is very high (0.8 in the 
long-run) (see Table 6), specificities in terms of their price volatility are less clear.  
Volatility, expressed by the conditional variance of the price series, is modelled with 
different features for arabica, robusta and cocoa, and suggests that there may be 
persistence in volatilities and that the price series are best estimated with a varying 
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variance.  We find different results for each of the three tropical commodities. The price 
model AR(1) is used for the cocoa price series, Robusta's prices are modelled with 
ARMA(1,1) process and, Arabica prices follow a ARMA(4,2) process. The conditional 
variance definition follows an EGARCH process with similar coefficients and a positive 
and significant 2  for both coffees, which suggests that, their volatility is more affected 
by positive shocks in prices than by negative price shocks. Moreover, a large increase in 
oil prices (considered a negative shock) will have a lower impact on coffee price 
variability than a steep decline in oil prices (positive shock) of a similar magnitude.  
Cocoa, on the other hand does not show any asymmetric pattern in its varying volatility. 
Thus, in a world of high oil prices, coffee price volatility is not as excessive as in a 
context of low oil prices; whilst cocoa price volatility is largely unchanged. 
 
Table 6 Arabica, Robusta and cocoa price correlations in current and constant 
prices, 1968-2011 
 
SHORT RUN: current prices   
1968-1990  Cocoa Arabica Robusta 
256 obs. Cocoa  -      
 Arabica 0.84  -    
 Robusta 0.90 0.96  -  
     
1990-2011  Cocoa Arabica Robusta 
256 obs. Cocoa  -      
 Arabica 0.6  -    
 Robusta 0.36 0.77  -  
     
SHORT RUN: constant prices   
1990-2010  Cocoa Arabica Robusta 
249 obs. Cocoa  -      
 Arabica 0.29  -    
 Robusta 0.09 0.76  -  
     
LONG RUN     
1960-2010  Cocoa Arabica Robusta 
 Cocoa  -    
 Arabica 0.908  -   
 Robusta 0.418 0.921  
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4 Impact of oil spillover effects and speculation on coffee and 
cocoa prices 
 
This section addresses two of the main underlying causes of coffee and cocoa price 
volatility. Commodity price variabilty mainly results from changes in their fundamentals 
namely, supply and demand. Figure 5 shows that for non-essential goods, variation in 
fundamentals do not necessarily reflect the extent of the price surges that have 
occurred over the past 20 years. 
 
Figure 5 Percentage variations in real prices, consumption and production, 1990 
to 2010: (a) coffee and (b) cocoa 
 
 
Source: Authors calulations based on ICO and ICCO data accessed July 2011. 
 
One of the reasons for the disconnection between production and prices in commodity 
markets may be explained by the Separation theorem according to which "when a 
futures market exists, the optimum production of the firm does not depend upon the 
(subjective) distribution of the random price nor upon the firm's attitude toward risk" 
(Broll and Zilcha, 1992). Thus whenever a futures market is available, the price and 
production of the commodity may grow independently. Therefore, we do not dwell 
upon an empirical analysis of the fundamentals for coffee and cocoa, but rather focus on 
two external drivers of these commodity prices namely, the energy sector represented 
by crude oil prices and the financial sector which is reflected by futures prices. In this 
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section, all the commodity prices are denominated in current dollar prices as only 
current prices are traded in the financial markets15.  
 
Barnard (1983) highlighted the potential for fuels to be disruptive to agricultural 
commodity prices. Activities such as: planting, the application of fertilizer, harvesting, 
storage and transportation require an important amount of diverse fuels; the most 
usual being crude oil, coal, gas, and more recently biofuels. Also, it has been argued that 
the prices of both coffees and cocoa are influenced by oil prices (Baffes J. 2007), and that 
current prices have been volatile in recent years hence providing traders with 
significant “trend-following opportunities” (ICE 2011). We utilize Granger-causality tests 
to assess the long-term causality links between oil and commodities prices while 
cointegration methods are used to assess the long-run relationship between cash and 
futures prices of cocoa and coffee. 
 
4.1 Cross commodity causality: Oil vs. Coffee and Cocoa 
 
In sub-Saharan Africa, cocoa is mainly grown by smallholder farmers (≤ 1 hectare) and 
often on a subsistence basis (ITC, 2001). Larger cocoa plantations exist in Brazil, 
Ecuador and Malaysia. Although cocoa is particularly sensitive to weather conditions 
and diseases that may negatively affect production, relatively little fertilizer is utilized 
(FAO 2006). On the other hand, coffee production is increasingly mechanized and uses 
various chemical fertilizers (e.g. nitrogen, potassium etc.) which are by-products of the 
petroleum industry. Here, we only consider the indirect effect of fertilizers prices on 
coffee and cocoa prices through the oil price. Fuels are also required for storage and 
transportation thus directly enhancing the potential transmission effect of oil prices on 
coffee and cocoa prices. Graph 8 (Annexes), shows that coffee and cocoa price changes 
were often preceded by variations in the oil price of a similar magnitude over the past 
fifty years. Therefore, we aim to determine whether causality between oil prices and, 
coffee and cocoa prices holds in the long-run considering the time-horizon: 1990-2010 
                                                        
15 However, constant dollar prices provide a better fit for estimating historical volatility. 
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and then, whether a similar trend between oil and, cocoa and coffee is empirically 
observed.  
 
First, we conduct Granger causality tests16 for crude oil, Arabica, Robusta, and cocoa 
using large lag lengths in order to account for a long adjustment period of the 
commodities prices to variations in the oil price, the results of which are presented in 
Table 7. 
 
Table 7 Granger-causality tests results 
Null Hypothesis Lags included Observations F-statistic Prob. 
LN_OIL does not   LN_ARABICA 48 208 1.901 0.003 
LN_ARABICA does not   LN_OIL   1.152 0.270 
LN_OIL does not   LN_COCOA 36 220 1.736 0.012 
LN_COCOA does not  LN_OIL   1.025 0.441 
LN_OIL does not  LN_ROBUSTA 51 205 1.694 0.012 
LN_ROBUSTA does not  LN_OIL   1.091 0.349 
Source: Annex - Table 1. 
 
Table 7 shows that we cannot reject the hypothesis that the oil price Granger-causes 
Arabica, Robusta and cocoa price variability at the 5 percent level (p-values: Prob. > 
0.05). However, the oil price is not Granger-caused by Arabica, Robusta or cocoa prices 
at the 5 percent level. It is important to highlight that the oil-commodity causality 
conclusions are dependent on the number of lags included. The results show that oil 
price spillover effects on Arabica and Robusta take approximately 4 years while it takes 
only 3 years for cocoa; which seems consistent with observations outlined in Figure 6. 
 
                                                        
16 'x is a Granger cause of y if present y can be predicted with better accuracy by using past values of x 
rather than by not doing so, other information being identical' (Charemza and Deadman 1992). 
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Figure 6 Variation in cocoa, Arabica, Robusta prices vs. oil prices (percent) 
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The concept of cointegration enables us to further determine the possible relationship 
between the variables. Now that a long-run causality link has been established between 
oil and beverages, we use cointegration tests to ascertain the long-run relationship 
between these variables. Empirically, two I(1) cointegrated series are defined, therefore 
if a linear combination of both is stationary I(0); an adjustment between these two 
variables prevents errors becoming larger in the long-term (Balcombe and Davis, 1994). 
Also, current coffee, cocoa, and oil prices should follow an I(1) process. The augmented 
Dickey-Fuller (ADF) tests reveal the presence of unit roots in levels (p-values > 0.05) 
but not in first differences (p-values < 0.05) hence, prices of the studied commodities 
are I(1) (see Table 8).  
 
Table 8 Unit root tests for Arabica Robusta Cocoa futures prices 
 
By means of equation (5.1), Granger cointegration tests are conducted, generating the 
residuals series tû  and then, estimating an ADF unit root test on those residuals by 
means of equation (5.2). Cointegration of the series implies that the ADF unit root test of 
the residuals tû  is stationary. 
 
attat uOilcC ,, .       (5.1) 
atC , : Current price at time t of a : { tA  , tR , tCocoa }  
at
p
j
ajtajatat uuu ,
1
,,,1,
ˆˆˆ   


   (5.2) 
 Futures Arabica "C" Futures Cocoa Futures Robusta 
Unit root in first-differences    
 Lag length 1 0 1 
 t-statistic Prob. t-statistic Prob. t-statistic Prob. 
ADF statistic -13.451 0.000 -12.819 0.000 -11.19 0.000 
        
Unit root in levels        
 Lag length 1 0 1 
  t-statistic Prob. t-statistic Prob. t-statistic Prob. 
ADF statistic  0.675 0.861 0.728 0.871 0.24 0.755 
Critical values: 1% -2.574  -2.574  -2.574  
 5% -1.942  -1.942  -1.942  
 10% -1.616  -1.616  -1.616  
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The results of equation (5.1) are presented in Table 12. The reported adjusted R-
squared provides a first hint regarding the cointegration of the variables. In the first 
regression, it indicates that variations in cocoa, Arabica and Robusta prices respectively 
explain 45%, 10% and 2% of the variations in oil prices. Test results indicate that, only 
cocoa prices are cointegrated with oil prices at the 5% level. Cointegration between oil 
prices and coffees prices (Arabica and Robusta) is weakly rejected at the 10% level. This 
suggests that although coffee production uses more technological and petro-chemical 
fertilizer inputs than cocoa, there is no linear relationship between coffee and oil 
whereas, such a relationship is observed for cocoa and oil. In fact, cocoa and oil price 
series may trend together in the long-run. In summary, although long-run causality 
from the oil sector to the beverage commodity sector is a valid assumption, only cocoa 
shares the same long-term trend as oil. Besides, a short-run analysis confirms the 
consistency of the long-run equilibrium relationship between cocoa and oil prices. As 
most coffee and cocoa exporting countries are oil importing price-takers, there is 
limited policy space for them to reduce their vulnerability to oil price fluctuations, 
whatever the implications for their commodity exports. 
 
Table 9 Ordinary Least Squares equations 
 
 
4.2 Cointegration models and results: the effect of speculation 
 
The global economic crises since 2008-2009 may have altered the nature of the 
relationship between futures and cash prices of some agricultural commodities. The 
2000 deregulation of financial instruments (futures) encouraged speculators to 
massively trade commodities in which they had no business interest; and therefore, 
Method: Least Squares 
Dependent Variable: LN_COCOA LN_ARABICA LN_ROBUSTA 
Variable Coef. Std. Error Coef. Std. Error Coef. Std. Error 
 
 (LN_OIL) 0.368 0.025 0.211 0.037 0.105 0.044 
C 3.796 0.087 4.735 0.129 4.539 0.153 
Adjusted R-squared 0.453 0.112 0.018 
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contributed to the price surges in food and energy sectors, destabilizing businesses and 
producer incomes (Ash et al., 2010, Gilbert and Morgan 2010). In fact, since 1990 cash 
coffee and cocoa prices and futures prices have tended to move in a similar direction, 
irrespective of increased speculation. It could therefore be argued that futures markets 
are quite efficient; as futures prices and cash prices are convergent and it is also likely 
that both variables are cointegrated. After verifying that futures prices are I(1) (see 
Table 10), we conducted Granger cointegration tests and obtained the following results 
(see Table 10 and Table 11) for the equations (5.3) and (5.4): 
 
atatat uFC ,,, .       (5.3) 
atC , : Cash price at time t for commodity a : { tA  , tR , tCocoa } 
atF , : Future price at time t for commodity a : { tA  , tR , tCocoa } 
at
p
j
ajtajatat uuu ,
1
,,,1,
ˆˆˆ   


   (5.4) 
 
Table 10 Unit root tests in levels and first-difference for Arabica, Robusta and 
cocoa futures prices 
 
If the two price series are I(1) and the linear combination of them is I(0), the variables 
are said to be cointegrated and thus, bivariate models may be specified to take into 
account the linear relationship between the two series in the short-run. ADF test results 
in Table 11 attest to the rejection of the null hypothesis of a unit root in the residuals at 
the 1% level (Prob. <0.05), thereby futures series and their corresponding cash prices 
 Futures Arabica "C" Futures Cocoa Futures Robusta 
Unit root in first-differences    
 Lag length 1 0 1 
  t-statistic Prob. t-statistic Prob. t-statistic Prob. 
ADF statistic -13.451 0.000 -12.819 0.000 -11.19 0.000 
        
Unit root in levels        
 Lag length 1 0 1 
  t-statistic Prob. t-statistic Prob. t-statistic Prob. 
ADF statistic  0.675 0.861 0.728 0.871 0.24 0.755 
Critical values: 1% -2.574  -2.574  -2.574  
 5% -1.942  -1.942  -1.942  
 10% -1.616  -1.616  -1.616  
 28 
series are cointegrated. The cointegration order (1, 1) and the cointegrating vector [1, -
ˆ ] corresponding to: [1, 0.98] for Arabica, [1, 1.02] for Robusta and [1, 0.925] for cocoa 
may be positively accepted (see Table 12). 
 
Table 11 Cointegration: ADF test on residuals 
  Arabica futures Cocoa futures Robusta futures 
t-statistic Prob. t-statistic Prob. t-statistic Prob. 
ADF statistic -2.789 0.0054 -9.139 0.000 -2.803 0.0052 
Critical 
values: 
      
1% -2.574  -2.574  -2.574  
5% -1.942  -1.942  -1.942  
10% -1.616  -1.616  -1.616  
 
Table 12 Ordinary Least Squares equations 
* denotes insignificance at a 5% level 
 
Engle and Granger (1987) notes that all cointegration series have an error correction 
representation. Positively accepted cointegration suggests that an error correction 
model (ECM) may be estimated to assess short-term price adjustments. We estimate the 
error correction mechanism with an unrestricted OLS in equation (5.5): 
 
atatatatat FCFC ,,1,12,10, ).(      (5.5) 
 
We replace   by its previously computed OLS estimate ˆ  so that atC , , atF ,  
and ).ˆ( ,1,1 atat FC    are all )0(I  (Charemza and Deadman, 1991) and the error is 
corrected ( at ,  ~ )0(I ). Given the Wald test results (see Table 13), we assume that 1ˆ   
hence, the Engle Granger equation is simplified as follow:  
 
 atatatatat
FCFC ,,1,12,10, )(      (5.6) 
 
Dependent 
Var.: 
LN_COCOA LN_ARABICA LN_ROBUSTA 
Variable Coefficient Std. Error Coefficient Std. Error Coefficient Std. Error 
 
   
  
0.981 
0.0647 
0.006 
0.0318 
1.0213 
-0.069* 
0.01 
0.055 
0.925 
0.446 
0.0058 
0.0278 
Adjusted R-
squared 0.989 0.976 0.982 
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The Arabica model (see Table 14) suggests that the predictive power of the model is 
very high; especially for Arabica and Robusta. Indeed adjusted R-squared for Arabica, 
Robusta and cocoa models are respectively 0.95, 0.90 and 0.70. 
 
Table 13 Wald Test: 1
ˆ   
Wald Test     
 Test Statistic Value df Probability 
Arabica t-statistic 2.12 254 0.035 
 F-statistic 4.50 (1, 254) 0.035 
 Chi-square 4.50 1 0.034 
Cocoa t-statistic -3.05 254 0.003 
 F-statistic 9.31 (1, 254) 0.003 
 Chi-square 9.31 1 0.002 
Robusta t-statistic -13.04 205 0.000 
 F-statistic 169.97 (1, 205) 0.000 
 Chi-square 169.97 1 0.000 
 
 
Table 14 OLS Error Correction Model 
atatatatat FCFC ,,1,12,10, )(     
 
 
Despite the low frequency of monthly data, it is possible to estimate the speed of 
adjustment between futures and cash prices. An ECM provides a good representation of 
Dependent 
Variable atC , : Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob. 
 0  -0.001 0.002 -0.729 0.466 
Arabicaa :  1  0.907 0.013 69.790 0.000 
 2  -0.030 0.018 -1.724 0.086 
 adjusted 
2R  0.951    
Cocoaa :  
 
0  
1  
-0.001 
 
0.800 
0.003 
 
0.032 
-0.226 
 
24.993 
 
0.821 
 
0.000 
 2  0.034 0.033 1.018 0.310 
 adjusted 
2R  0.716    
 0  0.005 0.003 1.445 0.150 
Robustaa :  1  0.843 0.021 40.622 0.000 
 2  -0.059 0.032 -1.844 0.067 
 adjusted 
2R  0.892    
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short-run adjustments between cash and futures markets for Arabica, Robusta and 
cocoa. Short-run adjustments are consistent with the long-run equilibrium relationship 
existing between cash and futures series suggesting that the speed of adjustment is very 
fast, and cocoa and coffee futures markets are reasonably efficient. 
 
 
5 Policy recommendations and conclusions 
 
Price fluctuations are inherent in agricultural markets – partly due to the supply-
demand dynamics and the unpredictability of weather patterns and harvest yields. 
There are debates as to the extent to which activity in futures trades and over the 
counter markets (OTC) for agricultural commodities impact on this volatility. Whatever 
the cause, extreme volatility in food prices deters producers from making the necessary 
investments for increasing productivity and production: this is one of the underlying 
causes of continued worldwide food insecurity. Indeed, recent weather catastrophes, oil 
price surges, inflation, declining value of the U.S. dollar and, growing financialization on 
futures exchange markets have greatly led to the unpredictability of food prices and 
market developments. Several international organizations have investigated policy 
responses in order to mitigate the risks associated with high prices and volatility in 
global food markets. A policy recommendation put forward by the G2017 suggests 
strengthening the long term productivity, sustainability and resilience of the CDDCs 
agricultural sector, through enhanced public investment and national food security 
programs. Increasing transparency in food and futures markets and, eliminating 
domestic trade policies would also reduce trade distortions and markets instabilities 
(Staatz and Weber, 2011 and, Limao and Panagariya, 2003). 
 
This paper examined volatility, oil, and futures spillover effects on three major tropical 
commodities: Arabica, Robusta and Cocoa. Volatility developments and implications 
were analyzed from the supply-side that is, exporting LDCs and CDDCs. In this case, 
large price decreases are simultaneously reflected in the trade balance and in the 
                                                        
17 Policy reports elaborated by FAO, IFAD, IMF, OECD, UNCTAD, WFP, the World Bank, the WTO, IFPRI, 
and the UN HLTF (2011). 
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longer-term has a detrimental effect on growth. On the other hand, sudden price hikes 
may encourage producers to increase production and adjust their investment decisions, 
which may trigger even more instability in the markets. The results of the presented 
GARCH models provide an accurate assessment of commodity price volatility. The 
conditional variances are found variant over time due to volatility clustering18, thus 
reverting to the mean rather than remaining constant or moving in a monotonic pattern 
over time, which justifies the use of a GARCH model. Further analysis reveals uneven 
effects in Arabica and Robusta price volatilities, which, are more affected by positive 
shocks than negative shocks. A good harvest in coffee crops will trigger more volatility 
in its price than a bad harvest. However, cocoa volatility reacts symmetrically to the 
market shocks whether positive or negative.  Cocoa price volatility is evident, regardless 
of whether there is a good or poor harvest. 
 
This paper considered potential causality and linkages between the crude oil price and, 
both coffees and cocoa prices in the long-run. It appears that variations in coffee and 
cocoa prices follow oil price variations with, respectively 4 and 3-year intervals. 
Nevertheless, the hypothesis of a long-run equilibrium relationship only holds between 
oil and cocoa prices meaning that, structural changes in the oil price will be directly 
reflected in cocoa prices. Baffes (2007) shows that the average price elasticity for cocoa; 
was high and significant while the average coffee elasticity was particularly low; in 
short a 100 per cent variation in the oil price causes a 49 per cent shift in cocoa prices, 
but does not cause a significant variation in coffee prices. In summary, oil price 
developments have no significant effect on coffee price variability in the short-run. On 
the other hand, policy-makers should closely monitor oil price surges as they appear to 
strongly influence cocoa prices and their volatility in both the short and long-run. 
 
We also examined the relationship between Arabica, Robusta and cocoa cash prices and 
their corresponding futures prices. The deregulation of financial and physical 
instruments in 2000, along with the introduction of new electronic trading 
opportunities in 2007 has raised concerns about efficiency in the coffee and cocoa 
                                                        
18 In contrast to the often-assumed log-normal distribution of asset price returns, it is often observed that 
periods of high price volatility follow periods of low volatility and vice versa. 
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futures markets. However, in this study, the observed cointegration between cash and 
futures series between 1990 and 2010 suggests that both ICE and LIFFE futures 
markets are (statistically) unbiased and therefore, serve as price discovery channels for 
coffee and cocoa sector participants. The very short adjustment period noticeable 
between futures and cash prices suggests that, hedging strategies mitigate price risk 
only if they are an immediate reaction to market activity. Nonetheless, the lack of 
statistical bias of futures markets does not necessarily imply a full-hedging of price risk 
(Broll and Zilcha 1992).  
 
In fact, the Separation theorem states that unbiased futures estimators of the spot prices 
do not imply that price risk is entirely avoided. Recent studies have shown that major 
speculative activity has increased price risk for cash market participants, particularly 
commercial traders (Schaffnit-Chatterjee, 2011 and, Schutter, 2010). As a consequence 
of increasing speculative activity, small farmers growing cocoa and coffee in developing 
countries are even more exposed to price risk, especially as few alternatives to manage 
price risk are available to them. Gabre-Madhin (2010) and, Fortenbery and Zapata 
(2004) have proposed the creation of local commodity exchanges which are more 
accessible to commercial hedgers (for example; the Ethiopia Commodity Exchange 
which reduces the incentives of speculators by imposing mandatory delivery and higher 
margins. Such initiatives may largely reduce price risk and thus, promote economic 
stability in many CDDCs. 
 
Commodity producers in developed countries are increasingly relying on hedging to 
mitigate exposure to price volatility. However, the extent of hedging in developing 
countries remains limited.  A few countries have used market-based instruments to 
mitigate the income risks.19 
 
The main reason for the low use of financial instruments is the lack of familiarity on the 
part of both private sector operators (especially farmers and exporters) and, in a few 
                                                        
19 For example, Mexico hedged, via options, all of its oil sales for 2009 in 2008 at a strike price of US$ 70 a 
barrel when the oil price was US$ 100 a barrel.19 The cost of purchasing options at US$ 1.5 billion enabled 
the programme to make a savings of more than US$ 5 billion.. 
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instances, the lack of interest from government officials. Using financial instruments in 
hedging requires technical and managerial expertise and an institutional framework 
that ensures adequate reporting, recording, monitoring and evaluating mechanisms. 
Furthermore, it is also necessary to establish internal control procedures that avoid and 
protect against speculative transactions.20  
 
Market-based instruments can play a fundamental role in building tailor-made facilities 
to address commodity price instability. However, it is doubtful whether the futures 
markets are as suitable for addressing problems emanating from price variability as 
they are for reducing uncertainty in revenue flows. This notwithstanding, futures 
markets do allow Governments to eliminate uncertainty associated with variability.  
 
Apart from emergency measures designed to assist the most vulnerable and the long-
term measures designed to tackle excessive commodity price volatility on the supply 
side, there is a need to consider how the functioning of commodity derivatives markets 
could be improved in a way that would enable those trading venues to better fulfill their 
role of providing reliable price signals to commodity producers and consumers. 
 
In light of the vital role of information flows in commodity price developments, a set of 
four policy responses to improve market functioning should be considered: First, 
greater transparency in physical markets would enable the provision of more timely 
and accurate information about commodities, such as spare capacity and global stock 
holdings for oil, and for agricultural commodities, areas under plantation, expected 
harvests, stocks and short-term demand forecast. This would allow commercial market 
participants to more easily assess current and future fundamental supply and demand 
relationships.  
 
Second, a better flow of and access to information in commodity derivatives markets, 
especially regarding position-taking by different categories of market participants, 
would further improve market transparency. In particular, measures designed to ensure 
                                                        
20 Claasens S (1992). How can developing countries hedge their bets? Finance and Development. 
September 1992. 
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reporting requirements for trading on European exchanges similar to those enforced in 
US exchanges would considerably improve transparency of trading and discourage 
regulatory migration.  
 
Third, tighter regulation of financial market participants, such as through establishing 
position limits, could contain financial investors’ impacts on commodity markets. For 
example, a rule could be applied to physical traders, prohibiting them from taking 
financial positions and betting on outcomes that they are able to influence due to their 
strong economic position in physical markets. This calls for finding the right balance 
between being adopting overly restrictive regulation, which would impair the price 
discovery and risk transfer functions of commodity exchanges, and overly lax 
regulation, which equally impairs the basic functions of the exchanges. 
 
Finally, there appears to be support for the contention that the behaviour of financial 
investors in following investments that align to their own preferences help explain 
movements in coffee and cocoa prices that the fundamentals alone are unable to 
account for. The rises in coffee and cocoa prices attracts more speculation from parties 
with no interests in owning the actual commodity but are investing solely on the basis 
of expected price changes on futures markets. As a result, the behaviour of financial 
investors/speculators continues to push prices above the equilibrium price of the 
commodity. In the very short-run (e.g. in daily price formation), a declining dollar seems 
likely to stimulate speculation in commodity markets rise in prices. We also find that 
growing speculation appears to link financial variables with coffee and cocoa prices 
during some periods. Although speculation was particularly high over the past four 
years, the equilibrium between financial and commodity variables holds (i.e. is linked) 
in the long-term. 
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7  Annex 
 
Table A1. Descriptive Statistics of Arabica, Robusta and Cocoa (in log) 
 
 ln(Rt) ln(At) ln(Ct) 
 Mean 4.746 5.293 4.891 
 Median 4.755 5.299 4.847 
 Maximum 5.881 6.274 5.580 
 Minimum 3.969 4.579 4.427 
 Std. Dev. 0.391 0.321 0.264 
 Skewness 0.226 0.383 0.575 
 Kurtosis 2.768 2.828 2.841 
    
Standard deviation 0.082 0.061 0.054 
    
 Sum 1181.668 1317.876 1217.934 
 Sum Sq. Dev. 37.918 25.523 17.332 
    
 Observations 249 249 249 
 
